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-IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------------------------
HOPE H. OPENSHAW, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
RICHARD CREED OPENSHAW, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 17369 
In this divorce modification action the Appellant 
petitioned the Court below to reduce arrearages in child sup-
port to Judgment, and to modify the Decree of Divorce to 
require increased child support, and to require the Respondent 
to pay for all medical expenses of the children. The 
Respondent filed a cross petition requesting that the Decree 
of Divorce be modified to re-establish the amount of child 
support and to allow the Respondent to claim the minor 
children as dependents for income tax purposes. 
II. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a hearing, the lower court, the Honorable Kenneth 
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Rigtrup, Judge Presiding, denied the Appellant's petition 
for modification, and in part granted the Respondent's 
petition for modification, reducing the monthly amount of 
child support and allowing the Respondent to claim both 
children as dependents for tax purposes, and reduced cer-
tain arrearages in child support to Judgment. 
The Appellant petitioned the Court for Relief from 
the Order granting the above modifications and to Re-open 
the hearing for additional evidence. The Court granted the 
Appellant's petition and took additional evidence. The 
Court then altered the modification to allow the Respondent 
to claim only one of the two minor children as a dependent 
for tax purposes. 
The Appellant has appealed the Court's decision in 
granting the Respondent certain modifications in the Divorce 
Decree. 
III. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks a ruling by this Court upholding 
and confirming the decision of the Court below. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Decree of Divorce between the Appellant and the 
d .. 1 Respondent was entered March 4, 1977, in the Third Ju ic1a 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County. 
On February 29, 1980, the Appellant filed a Motion for 
an Order to Show Cause which was granted requiring the 
-7-
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Respondent to appear and show cause (a) why arrearages in 
child support should not be reduced to Judgment, (b) why 
the Respondent should not be ordered to pay all medical 
expenses incurred for both minor children, and (c) why 
attorney's fees and other relief should not be granted. 
On March 5, 1980, the Respondent filed a Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce to (a) set a specific and 
permanent amount of child support, (b) allow the Respondent 
to claim the two minor children as dependents for tax pur-
poses, and (c) grant other relief. 
On March 18, 1980, the Appellant filed a Petition for 
Modification seeking the same relief as sought in the initial 
Order to Show Cause plus requesting that the Court increase 
the Respondent's child support obligation from two hundred 
dollars ($200.) per month per child to two hundred and 
fifty dollars ($250.) per month per child. 
The matter was partially heard on March 14, 1980, when 
the Court granted a Judgment for arrearages in support 
against the Respondent in the sum of twelve hundred dollars 
($1,200.) plus attorney's fees in the sum of one hundred 
dollars ($100.). 
The matter was heard with regard to the cross petitions 
for modification on March 28, 1980. Evidence was profered by 
both parties, financial statements from both parties were 
submitted, copies of the Appellant's check stubs were sub-
mitted, the Court reviewed the pleadings including Answers 
to Interrogatories, and the matter was argued by counsel to 
-8-
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the Court. 
The Appellant sought to increase support to two hundred 
fifty dollars ($250.) per month per child and to require 
Respondent to pay all medical bills for both children not 
covered by his insurance. The Petition for an increase to 
two hundred fifty dollars ($250.) per month was withdrawn 
by Appellant's counsel at the hearing (T.R. p.131). The 
request that the Respondent should pay all medical bills 
was before the Court and denied; that denial is not at issue 
in this appeal. No evidence was presented as to the health 
of the minor children or the need for such a modification; 
no argument was made regarding the request; and, the Court 
made no finding regarding that situation. The request for 
that modification was abandoned by Appellant. 
The Court denied the Appellant's Petition for Modifica-
tion and granted in part, the Respondent's Petition for 
Modification. The Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law based upon the evidence and hearing of March 28, 1980, 
and entered an Order modifying the Decree of Divorce as 
follows: 
1) Child support was permanentlyset at one hundred 
seventy-five dollars ($175.) per month for each of the 
two teenage children reduced from two hundred dollars 
($200.) per month per child; and 
2) The Respondent was allowed to claim both of the 
children as dependents for income tax purposed beginning 
with the year 1980, whereas the Appellant had been 
allowed to claim both in prior years; and 
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3) Granting other relief which is not pertinent to 
this appeal. 
On August 21, 1980, the Court, the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup heard the Appellant's request to reconsider and 
re-open the hearing and in part granted the relief sought. 
The Order of March 28, 1980, amending the Decree was modified 
to allow the Respondent to claim only the oldest minor child 
as a dependent for income tax purposes; otherwise the Order 
of March 28, 1980, remained intact. 
The Appellant has filed a timely Notice of Appeal of the 
lower court's rulings of March 28, 1980, and August 21, 1980. 
v. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant and Respondent were married in Evanston, 
Wyoming on June 24, 1961, and were divorced in Salt Lake 
County, Utah on March 4, 1977. (T.R. pp. 27-33). 
At the time of the divorce the parties had two minor 
children, Larry age 11 and Thomas, age 8; custody of the two 
minor children was awarded to the Appellant. (T.R. pp.27-33.) 
While the divorce was pending the Appellant, in a 
financial statement and affidavit of January 12, 1977, indicated 
to the Court that her monthly minimum household expenses 
were five hundred fifty dollars and sixty-seven cents ($550.67) 
per month for her support and the support of the two minor 
children. (T.R. pp.12-14). There is no findings or other 
evidence in the Court record or the stipulations of the parties 
as to the household expenses of the Appellant as of the time 
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of the divorce; however the stipulation settling the case 
was filed and dated February 18, 1977, only a month after 
the Appellant submitted her affidavit of expenses on January 
12, 1977. (T.R. pp.23-25-). 
At the time of the divorce the Appellant, Mrs. Openshaw, 
was unemployed; she could not work because of the physical 
condition of the minor child Thomas. (T.R. pp.12-13; see 
also the Affidavit of Mrs. Openshaw, T.R. p.40). 
At the time of the divorce the Respondent, Mr. Openshaw 
was employed by ZCMI earning take home net pay in the sum of 
four hundred and seventy-five dollars ($475.) per month. 
(T.R. p. 28). 
The Respondent was ordered to pay monthly child support 
in the original decree in the amount of one hundred dollars 
($100.) per month per child based upon his net monthly in-
come of four hundred and seventy-five dollars ($475.). The 
child support was ordered to be automatically increased by 
fifty per cent (50%) of any additional take home pay of the 
Respondent, up to a maximum of two hundred dollars ($200.) 
per month per child. (T.R. p.28 & p. 35). 
The Respondent was ordered in the original Decree to 
maintain health and accident for the benefit of the minor 
children and to pay for the costs of prescription drugs for 
the treatment of the asthma and blood disease of the minor 
child Thomas. (T.R. pp. 32-33). 
Within four months after the entry of the Decree the 
Appellant secured employment and was earning approximately 
five hundred and forty-four dollars ($544.) per month with 
-ll- I 
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a raise of five per cent (5%) effective July 4, 1977, to a 
total of five hundred and seventy-one dollars and twenty 
cents ( $5 71. 20) per month. (T. R. p. 40). 
In October, 1979, the Respondent was earning more than 
eight hundred dollars ($800.) per month and pursuant to the 
original Decree was then obligated to pay two hundred dollars 
($200.) per month per child as child support. (T.R. p.79). 
The Appellant filed an Order to Show Cause (T.R. p.52) 
and a Petition for Modification (T.R. p. 65) seeking to: 
a) Increase child support to two hundred and fifty 
dollars ($250.) per month per child; and, 
b) Reduce arrearages in child support to Judgment; and, 
c) Require the Respondent to p.ay all medical expenses 
of both children; and, 
d) Be awarded attorney's fees and other relief. 
The Respondent filed a Petition for Modification (T.R. 
pp. 55-57) seeking to stablize and set permanent child sup-
port and to allow the Respondent to claim the two children as 
dependents for tax purposes and for other relief. 
Arrearages in child support were reduced to Judgment on 
March 14, 1980. (T.R. p. 79). 
The cross-petitions for modification were heard by the 
Court on March 28, 1980. The following evidence was before 
the Court on March 28, 1980. 
The Appellant was employed and had gross monthly earnings 
of nine hundred ninety-eight dollars and forty cents ($998.40) 
and net monthly earnings of seven hundred sixty-nine dollars 
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and two cents ($769.02). (T.R. p. 64-financial statement, 
p. 78-financial statement; pp. 74-75-check stubs; p. 69-
Answers to Interrogatories; pp.126-127-transcript of testimor 
p. 88-Findings of Fact). 
The Appellant had monthly household expenses for herself 
and the two children of the parties in the a.mount of eight 
hundred ninety-six dollars and thirty-five cents ($896.35) 
per month. The a.mount represented the average monthly 
expenditures of the Appellant to maintain herself and the 
two children. (T.R. p. 64-financial statement; p. 78-
financial statement; p. 126-transcript of testimony; p. 88-
Findings of Fact). The Appellant had recently voluntarily 
increased her monthly hane mortgage payments from two 
hundred twelve dollars ($212.) to three hundred forty-three 
dollars and forty-five cents ($343.45) per month. (T.R. 
p. 84). 
The Respondent was employed and had gross monthly 
earnings of one thousand six hundred thirty-five dollars and 
forty three cents ($1,635.43) and net monthly earnings of 
one thousand two hundred nine dollars and forty-six cents 
($1,209.46). (T.R. p. 73-financial statement; p. 126-trans-
cript of testimony; p. 88-Findings of Fact). 
The Respondent had monthly expenses for the operation 
of his household in the sum of one thousand one hundred forty· 
two dollars and seventy-three cents ($1, 142. 73). That includei 
support for his current spouse and his step-daughter, Jsanu. 
(T.R. p. 73-financial statement; p. 126-transcripts of 
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testimony; p. 88-Findings of Fact). 
The Respondent had re-married after his divorce from the 
Appellant; the re-marriage was before July, 1979. The 
Respondent's current spouse, Shirley Openshaw has a minor 
daughter, Jsanu. The Respondent's current spouse was un-
employed because of her physical condition. The minor 
child, Jsanu was not receiving: any child support or maintence 
from her natural father. The Respondent was fully supporting 
the minor step-daughter, Jsanu. (T.R. p. 67; p. 73; pp. 
129-130; pp. 87-88). 
During the period September 1979, through and including 
February 1980, the Respondent was falling behind in his 
monthly child support payments to the Appellant in the 
average amount of one hundred and seventy-four dollars 
($174.) per month. (T.R. p. 73). His actual obligation 
then being a total of four hundred dollars ($400.) per month. 
The two minor children of the parties, Thomas and Larry 
were now teenagers, age 12 and 15 respectively. (T.R. p. 27; 
p. 87). The Court found that the two teenage boys were old 
enough that they could find odd jobs to earn their own spending 
money and minor expenses. (T.R. p. 89). 
The Appellant in support of her motion to re-open the 
hearing and take more evidence submitted an un-controverted 
Affidavit (T.R. pp.93-96) and stated that as a result of not 
being able to claim both minor children on her income tax 
withholding that her monthly net income was reduced by forty-
eight dollars and twelve cents ($48.12). 
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After the foregoing evidence was submitted to the Court, 
the Court modified the Order and allowed the Appellant to 
claim the youngest child, age 12, as a dependent for tax 
purposes, (T.R. p. 107); the Respondent was allowed to claim 
the older child. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELIANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED FACTS 
OR GROUNDS SUFFICIENT FOR THIS COURT TO 
OVER-RULE THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT BELOW 
This action was heard below as an equitable matter upon 
cross petitions for modification of a Divorce Decree entered 
three years before. The appeal fran a Divorce Decree or 
from the modification of a Divorce Decree is an equitable 
matter. King vs. King, 25 Utah 2d 163, 478 P.2d 492 (1970), 
An equitable appeal to the Utah Supreme Court is reviewed by 
the Court de novo. Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 9; Foreman vs. 
Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176 P.2d 144 (1947). 
A de ~ review on appeal by the Utah Supreme Court is 
not a new trial but an appellate proceeding based upon the 
district court's record. Foreman vs. Foreman, ibid. In 
such a review this Court is not bound by the Findings of 
Fact of the lower court; this Court makes an independent 
study of the record, weighs the evidence and exercises its 
own independent judgment. Harding vs. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 
277, 488 P.2d 308 (1971). 
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In such an equitable review, the Findings of Fact of 
the Court below are presumed by the Supreme Court to be 
valid and correct due to the trial judge's advantageous 
position, having heard and seen the evidence first hand. 
Harding vs. Harding, ibid. 
The burden is on the Appellant to show that the Findings 
of Fact of the Court below are in error. Harding vs. Harding, 
ibid. 
The Supreme Court in this case and in all similar cases 
must review all of the evidence presented in the light most 
favorable to the lower court's findings. Ross vs. Ross, 592 
P.2d 600, 602 (1979-Utah); Carter vs. Carter, 584 P.2d 904, 
906 (Utah 1978); Watson vs. Watson, 561 P.2d 1072, 1074 
(Utah-1977); Baker vs. Baker, 551 P.2d 1263, 1265 (1976); 
Harding vs. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277, 279, 488 P.2d 308, 310 
(1971); Stone vs. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378, 380, 431 P.2d 802, 
803 (1967). 
Viewing the evidence presented in the Court below as 
set forth in the Statement of Facts and established by the 
record on appeal in this case, this Court cannot rule that 
the lower court's findings were in error. 
This Court should not disturb the findings of the Court 
below simply because this Court might have viewed the matter 
different. This Court may disturb the findings of the Court 
below only if this Court can find that: 
a) the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial 
court's findings; or, 
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b) there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error; or, 
c) there has plainly been such an abuse of discretion 
that an injustice has resulted. 
Ross vs. Ross, ibid.; Carter vs. Carter, ibid.; Watson vs. 
Watson, ibid.; Baker vs. Baker, ibid.; Harding vs. Harding, 
ibid.; Stone vs. Stone, ibid. 
The Appellant has not made a prima facie showing in 
her brief that any of the circumstances exist as set forth 
above, which would allow this Court to disturb the findings 
of the Court below. The Appellant has not met her burden 
in this appeal. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
BELOW CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS 
The evidence submitted to the Court below clearly sup-
ports the findings of the Court and justifies the ruling of 
the Court. 
The evidence presented in the record at the time of the 
hearing as to the income and expenses of the parties is as 
follows: 
INCOME OF PARTIES AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE March 4, 1977 
Appellant, Mrs. Openshaw NONE 
(T.R. pp.12-13; p.40) Unemployed 
Respondent, Mr. Openshaw $475. net per month 
(T.R. p. 28) 
MINIMUM MONTHLY EXPENSES OF APPELLANT, MRS. OPENSHAW 
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January, 1977 
Appellant, Mrs. Openshaw $550.67 
(T.R. po.12-14) 
Respondent, Mr. Openshaw no findings 
INCOME OF THE PARTIES AT JULY 5, 1977 
Appellant, Mrs. Openshaw $571.20 net per month 
(T. R. p. 40) 
Respondent, Mr. Openshaw No finding 
INCOME OF THE PARTIES ON MARCH 28, 1980 
Appellant, Mrs. Openshaw 
(T.R. p. 64; pp.74-75) 
Respondent, Mr. Openshaw 
$769.02 net per month 
plus child support from 
Respondent 
$1,209.46 net per month 
AVERAGE MONTHLY EXPENSES OF PARTIES ON MARCH 28, 1980 
Appellant, Mrs. Openshaw 
(T.R. p. 64; p. 126) 
for self and two children 
of the parties 
Respondent, Mr. Openshaw 
(T.R. p. 73; p. 126) 
for self, current spouse 
and step-daughter 
$896. 35 
$1,142.73 
includes partial child 
support from Respondent to 
Appellant-Average $226.51 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION OF RESPONDENT 
DIVORCE March 4, 1977 
(T.R. p.32) 
MODIFICATION HEARING March 28, 1980 
(T. R. pp. 79-80) 
$200. total per month plus 
insurance and prescription 
drugs 
$400. total per month 
plus insurance and 
prescription drugs 
Examining the past and current incomes, expenses and 
situations of the parties as set out above, this Court cannot 
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say that the findings and ruling of the Court below,were not 
justified and supported by the evidence. 
Based upon the evidence as set forth above, the Court: 
a) Reduced child support for the two teenage boys from 
two hundred dollars ($200.) per month each to one hundred, 
seventy-five dollars ($175.) per month each; and, 
b) Allowed the Respondent to claim one of the boys, the 
oldest as a dependent for income tax purposes. 
There was a substantial change in circumstances of the 
parties and modification of the Decree was in order. Based 
upon the evidence presented the Court below made two minor 
changes; child support was reduced by a total of 12.5% and 
Respondent received a tax deduction for the oldest boy that 
will benefit the Respondent for three years until the child 
reaches 18. 
Based upon the evidence in the record the actions of 
the Court below were not an abuse of discretion. The evidence 
and findings of the Court below as to the improved situations 
of both parties supports the action of the Court in a minor 
reduction of support and the awarding of the tax dependency 
claim for a period of three years. Such a minor change in 
the Decree cannot be said to be an injustice in light of the 
changed circumstances of the parties. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD 
AND APPLIED THE LAW IN THIS CASE 
The amount of a child support award can be increased or 
decreased if there has been a substantial change in the 
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circumstances of the parties involved. Kessimakis vs. 
Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978); Russell vs. Russell, 
551 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976);Gardner vs. Gardner, 111 Utah 286, 177 
P.2d 743 (1947); Buzzo vs. Buzzo, 45 Utah 625, 148 P. 362 
(1915). The District Court has continuing jurisdiction 
after it has rendered a divorce decree to modify or issue 
new orders with respect to child support. Dehm vs. Dehm, 
545 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah 1976); Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 
(1953 as amended). The person seeking the modification of 
the decree has the burden of showing a significant change in 
material circumstances so as to justify court action in 
modifying the original award. Auerbach vs. Auerbach, 571 
P.2d 1349, 1350 (Utah 1977); Sorensen vs. Sorensen, 18 Utah 
2d 102, 417 P.2d 118 (1966). 
The Court below received evidence showing a substantial 
change in material circumstances of the parties. The health 
of the minor child Thomas had improved such that the Appellant 
could work. The Appellant who had been earning nothing at 
the time of the divorce now had a substantial income. The 
Respondent's employment which had been in flux had now 
stablized. The Respondent had remarried and was now legally 
obligated to support his step-daughter. The Respondent was 
now employed at Kennecott Copper Corporation and had group 
health and accident insurance through Kennecott Copper for 
the benefit and protection of his two teenage children. The 
Appellant had voluntarily increased her house payments from 
two hundred twelve dollars ($212.) to three hundred forty-three 
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dollars and forty-five cents ($343.45) per month. 
The evidence presented to the Court clearly established 
a substantial change in material circumstances of the parties. 
The Court was then justified under the law in modifying the 
child support amount and allowing the Respondent to claim one 
child as a dependent for tax purposes. The support reduction 
of 12.5% and allowing tax dependency for three years is a 
minor alteration in light of the substantial change in the 
parties circumstances. 
The Appellant emphasizes in her brief that the re-
marriage of the Respondent is not grounds for modification 
of the Decree; that is the law in Utah. There were many 
other changes in circumstances as set forth above and a 
change in Utah law which justify the modification. If the 
only factor presented to the Court had been the Respondent's 
re-marriage, the Court should not have granted a reduction 
in child support; however, there were many other major 
changes which justified modification. 
POINT IV 
UTAH IAW CREATED AN ADDITIONAL SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION FOR THE RESPONDENT JUSTIFYING 
A MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-3 (1953 as amended) creates 
a statutory obligation for a man to support his wife when she 
is in need. Despite that statutory obligation, the Utah Gour~; 
have clearly stated that the re-marriage of a man with a 
support ob ligation from a previous marriage, is not in and 
of itself grounds to reduce the support obligation. ~ v; 
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Heltman, 29 Utah 2d 444, 511 P.2d 720; Harris vs. Harris, 
14 Utah 2d 96, 377 P.2d 1007 (1963). 
This Court said in Wright vs. Wright: 
~Thile this Court is sympathetic to the financial 
d~mand~ and burdens imposed on second-family 
situations, nevertheless, the undertaking to 
support stepchildren does not relieve the parent 
of his obligation to support his own natural 
children. Wright vs. Wright, 586 P.2d 443, 445 
(Utah 1978) 
The law in Utah as decided prior to 1979, was clear 
neither the re-marriage nor the undertaking of support for 
stepchildren was justification for reduction of child sup-
port. Prior to 1979, there was no statutory obligation 
for a step-parent to support a step-child. 
The Respondent in the case at bar was divorced 
in 1977, and re-married prior to July, 1979. His new wife 
has a minor daughter. When he re-married the Respondent had 
no duty to support his step-daughter. On July 1, 1979, Utah 
Code Annotated, § 78-45-4.1 (1953 as amended), became 
effective and the Respondent was obligated by law to support 
his step-daughter; that section provides: 
A step-parent shall support a stepchild to the same 
extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required 
to support a child. 
The Respondent re-married and gained a step-daughter 
at a time when he was under no legal obligation to support 
the stepdaughter. After his re-marriage, the Utah Legislature 
created a new statutory obligation forcing the Respondent to 
support his step-daughter. The Respondent had no control 
over this new obligation created after he had re-married. 
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The Respondent did not voluntarily increase his financial 
burden. The obligation to support his step-daughter was 
thrust upon the Respondent by a legislature, a burden 
involuntarily forced upon him. 
At the time of the hearing the Respondent was fully 
supporting his step-daughter as required by law. (T.R. 
p. 73). 
Had the Respondent re-married after July 1, 1979, 
knowing that he would be legally obligated to support his 
new step-daughter, then such a voluntarily created new 
obligation should not be considered by the Court. 
The involuntarily created obligation of the Respondent 
to support a step-daughter is much different from a 
voluntarily created financial burden such as re-marriage. 
The Court was justified in considering and allowing the 
newly created support obligation for the Respondent's 
step-daughter to be a factor in the reduction of the child 
support obligation. 
POINT V. 
THIS CASE WAS FULLY AND 
PROPERTY HEARD BY THE COURT BELOW 
The Appellant in her Brief and in her Motions for 
Amendment of Modified Decree, To Open the Judgment for An 
Additional Formal Hearing and for Entry of an Amendment to 
the Modification of Decree, and Relief from the Court's 
Modified Decree (T.R. pp. 85-86) alleges that the hearing in 
the Court below was not a full hearing and was "informal" 
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such that the Court's ruling was not proper. The Court 
below granted both parties a fully opportunity to be heard 
and in fact granted the Appellant's request, re-opened the 
proceeding, received additional evidence, and granted an 
amendment to the Modification of the Decree. (See Appel-
lant's Affidavit, T.R. pp. 93-99; and Order Granting 
Amendment, T. R. p. 107). 
The Appellant's brief states that the hearing on both 
of the cross-petitions for modification was "limited by the 
Honorable Judge Rigtrup to an informal conference with the 
Attorneys, followed by a reported argument of Counsel, with 
the parties present. No sworn testimony was taken." 
(Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts, page 2). The 
Appellant's Motions for Reconsideration by the Court (T.R. 
pp. 93-99) request a "formal hearing" by the Court, and 
states that additional material facts were "not clearly 
divulged to the Honorable Court, (and) were not properly 
allowed to be presented by formal testimony." 
There is a transcript of a portion of the hearing on 
the cross-petitions for modification. (T.R. pp.125-123). 
That transcript reflects the argument of counsel, but is 
also reflects in part the evidence recieved by the Court by 
stipulation and by prefer of counsel during the "informal 
conference" of counsel with the Court. 
Prior to the reported hearing, counsel had discussed 
the case with the Court, had submitted financial statements 
of the parties and explained the positions of each side to 
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the Court. The financial statements of each of the parties 
are a matter of record. (T.R. p. 64; p. 73). The Court 
refers to those in the transcript and ask each of the parties ! 
if they are correct. (T.R. pp. 126-127). Those financial 
statements had been profered to the Court by respective 
counsel along with other information as to what each of the 
parties would testify if sworn. Those financial statements 
and information were accepted by the Court without objection 
or dispute from either counsel; those facts were proved as 
provided by Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The check 
stubs indicating the wages and income of the Appellant were 
similarly admitted into evidence. (T.R. pp. 74-75; pp. 126· 
127). 
The Court requested counsel to profer into the record am 
additional information or evidence. The transcript states in 
part: 
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to profer into 
the record the situation concerning what the 
respective circumstances were at the date of the 
last order in this matter concerning child support 
and monthly alimony? 
MR. MIDGLEY: Yes, Your Honor. 
(T.R. p. 127) 
**** 
THE COURT: Are there any other circumstances that 
ought to be on the record, other than the two ex-
hibits which contain the itemized expenses, as well 
as the income? 
MR. BARNARD: Yes, Your Honor, I think so. 
(T.R. p. 128) 
Both counsel were allowed ample opportunity to profer 
-25-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
information and evidence and to argue their respective 
cases to the Court on the record. 
The fact that an informal non-recorded conference had 
been held did not in anyway preclude the presentation of 
evidence by profer to the Court below on March 28, 1980. 
Tha Appellant requested the Court to reconsider its 
ruling of March 28, 1980. In support of that request the 
Appellant submitted an Affidavit (T.R. pp. 93-99). The 
Affidavit was accepted by the Court and was considered on 
August 21, 1980. The Affidavit recited that allowing the 
Respondent to claim both children as dependents caused a 
net decrease in the Appellant's take-home pay in the amount 
of forty-eight dollars and twelve cents ($48.12) per month. 
(T.R. p. 84). That evidence was considered when the Court 
amended the modification and allowed the Respondent to claim 
only one of the minor children as a tax dependent. (T.R. 
p. 107). 
The Court granted both sides full opportunity to be 
heard both on and off the record on March 28, 1980, and to 
profer any information or evidence regarding the case. 
There was no objection by either parties' counsel to that 
procedure at that hearing. After the hearing, Appellant's 
counsel objected to the "informal" nature of the hearing and 
requested to be allowed to submit additional evidence, he was 
allowed to do so through the Appellant's Affidavit. 
The extensive Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
adopted and entered by the Court (T.R. pp. 87-90) were not 
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"made out of whole cloth". Those Findings were based upon 
the evidence profered and received by the Court without 
objection. 
The interest of judicial economy require that evidence 
be presented as expeditiously as possible. In this case it 
was done by stipulation and profer and without objection. 
When the Appellant raised questions as to the evidence that 
she was allowed to present, the Court accepted and considered 
an additional Affidavit with more evidence. The parties 
received a full opportunity to be heard twice in the Court 
below. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court below fully considered the evidenc~ and 
arguments of both parties in the case. The evidence pre-
sented established a substantial change in material 
circumstances of the parties and justified the modification 
of the Decree of Divorce. The modification granted (a) 
a 12.5% reduction in child support and (b) allowing a tax 
dependency benefit for three years, was minimal. There was 
not sufficient grounds for this Court to disturb the 
Findings of the Court below the evidence in the record 
clearly supports the lower Court's Findings; the Court below 
understood and properly applied the law; and there has not 
been a substantial nor prejudicial error nor has there been 
an abuse of discretion by the Court below resulting in any 
injustice. 
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-The decision and ruling of the Court below should be 
affirmed and the Respondent should be granted his costs on 
this appeal. 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent to L. E. Midgley, Esq., 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, at 320 South 300 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service this 6lllt day of ffeil',-4 , 1981. 
&££4~ 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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